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This paper analyzes the role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in Japan in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth 
century, from the standpoint of Historical Institutional Analysis (Greif[1997]).  The quantitative economic history literature has 
made clear that sustainable economic growth based on a market economy started in Japan at the end of the eighteenth century.  
On the other hand, from time to time the central government (Bakufu) legislated ordinances prescribing that suits on pecuniary 
matters would not be accepted (Aitai Sumeshi Rei).  The implication is that the public system for third-party contract enforcement 
was not working well. 
The activities of merchant coalitions substituted for public third-party enforcement in premodern Japan.  Many of the 
merchant coalition s’ codes prescribed that all of each coalition’s members should suspend transaction with those who cheated any 
one of the members of the coalition.  This was the multiple punishment strategy (MPS), as formulated by Greif[1993].  The MPS 
of the merchant coalition reduced incentives for the players in the market to cheat, which in turn promoted development of a 
market economy.  It is remarkable that the Japanese merchant coalition applied the MPS not only to ordinary commodity trade, 
but also to the putting-out system and employment.  
We empirically tested the above hypothesis about the function of the coalition.  In 1841, the Bakufu prohibited the coalition, 
intending to eliminate any monopoly.  This event can be regarded as a natural experiment, suitable for an investigation into the 
role of the coalition.  The above hypothesis implies that prohibition of the coalition lowered the performance of the market 
economy.  This implication was examined using data on the money supply and commodity prices.  As predicte d by the 
hypothesis, we found that the growth rate of the real money supply contracted and that the efficiency of price arbitrage declined. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we re-examine the role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in Japanese economic development in the eighteenth 
and the first half of the nineteenth century (hereafter, the Edo Era).  There are three strands in the literature on this topic.  The first 
one is the methodological literature on the institutional analysis of economic history.  North and Thomas[1973] and North[1990, 
1991] stressed the role of the institution, especially the public institution for protecting  property rights, as a basis for modern 
economic development.  Based on this, and collaborating with  the following economists developing the Comparative Institutional 
Analysis (Aoki[1998], and Hayami and Aoki eds.[1998]), Greif[1989, 1993, 1997] substantially expanded the perspectives of the 
institutional analysis of economic history.  He developed the methodology of Historical I nstitutional Analysis (HIA), which 
analyzes the mechanism of the emergence of private institutions, using a game -theoretic framework.  
The second theme is the literature on Japanese economic development in the Edo Era, which has been produced since the 
prewar period.  This literature has made clear that the Edo society was based on a developed market  economy.  The research 
concerning  quantitative economic history , especially  since  the 1970s, has provided new quantitative evidence of the development 
of a market economy (Sinbo[1978]; Sinbo and Saito[1989]; Ito[1993]; Wakita[1996]).  Meanwhile, Iwahashi[1988] examined the 
institutional basis of economic development in the Edo Era, using North’s framework.  He stressed that institutions supporting 
economic development existed in the Edo Era, including a stable political regime, a land tax system providing peasants with 
production incentives, unified weights and measures, regulation dividing the people into classes of peasants, merchants and 
artisans, and so on. 
The contribution of Iwahashi[1988], which focused on the institutional aspect of the premodern Japanese economy, should 
be stressed.  However, it lacks a feature that is essential in North ’s framework.  Namely, Iwahashi[1988] does not pay attention 
to third party enforcement of contracts by the public authorities.  As we discuss in  Section 2, the public system for contract 
enforcement had a serious flaw in the Edo Era.  The coexistence of  high economic development and a fragile public system of 
contract enforcement in the Edo Era presents a puzzle in North ’s framework.  The main purpose of this paper is to resolve this 
puzzle. 
The third theme  is the literature on kabu nakama.  We suppose that kabu nakama is the key  to resolving the puzzle.  There is 
a classic book on kabu nakama by Mataji Miyamoto in which he writes that “the intermediate organizations, such as kabu nakama, 
could exist only on the condition that the state or the public  authorities were not well developed”, that “in premodern Japan, 
statutory  commercial law had not yet  been legislated and formal commercial rules did not exist”, and that “the commercial 
customs of kabu nakama were the only standards for trade, and not only did the Bakufu’s court refer to the customs, but also each 
kabu nakama itself resolved commercial conflicts” (Miyamoto[1938], pp.151–152).  It is remarkable that as early as the  1930s 
Miyamoto[1938] pointed out that private organizations played the role of contract enforcers in a society in which the public system 
of third party enforcement was incomplete 1. 
                                                                    
1 Concerning the literature on the kabu nakama in the postwar period, see Imai[1989] and Iwabushi [1994].  In the 1960s and early 
1970s, research focused on the kabu nakama as a part of the political regime in the Edo Era (Tsuda[1961]; Hayashi[1967]; 
Nakai[1971]).  In recent years, research has focused on the kabu nakama as a social group composing the city (Yoshida[1985]; 
Imai[1989]).  On the other hand, we intend to shed new light on the economic aspects of the kabu nakama, which Miyamoto[1938]   3
In this paper, following Miyamoto[1938], we analyze the contract-enforcement function of  kabu nakama, using the Historical 
Institutional Analysis framework.  We intend not only to present a new theoretical hypothesis on the function of  kabu nakama, but 
also to test the hypothesis  empirically.  A weakness of the HIA is the small amount of previous empirical research, because of the 
difficulty common to other applied fields of game theory2.  In this respect, our research focusing on Edo Era Japan is significant.  
As stated later, the Bakufu prohibited and dissolved  kabu nakama  in 1842.  This historical event can be regarded as a natural 
experiment for testing the role of kabu nakama.  Using this opportunity, we test a theoretical hypothesis on the role of kabu nakama 
with the quantitative data, as well as with descriptive documents. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we provide an overview of the economic development and the legal system 
in Edo Era Japan, from which we derive the puzzle mentioned above.  In  Section 3, we examine the codes of  kabu nakama, and 
present a theoretical hypothesis on the role of kabu nakama.  In Section 4, we test the hypothesis of the previous section, utilizing 
the natural experiment after 1842.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Economic development and legal system in Edo Era: An overview 
 
(1)  Development of the market economy 
Among the quantitative research on Edo Era Japan, Akashi[1989] focused on the macro aspect of economic development.  He 
measured the economic growth from 1725 to 1856, based on an original estimation of the real money supply, and found that while 
there was no trend in the real money stock until 1790, since that year an upward trend of 0.7% per year on average emerged 
(Figure 1).  He interpreted the growth of the real money supply as a measure of economic growth, assuming that  the Marshallian 
k was constant over time.  Although the assumption of a constant k is restrictive, if we accept it, the implication of his finding is 
substantial. 
First, it supports the view that sustainable economic development started before the Meiji Restoration, an issue that other 
quantitative economic history literature has addressed.  At the same time, it implies that the starting point of  the sustainable 
growth was not around 1820 as that literature has supposed, but around 1790 (Akashi[1989] pp.47–48)3.  That economic growth 
started around 1790 is significant for us, because it coincided with the so-called Tanuma Period, during which Roju (the head of 
the Bakufu bureaucracy) Okitsugu Tanuma implemented a policy promoting  kabu nakama. 
Besides the macro aspect, much literature has made clear that the Edo society was a society with a mature market economy.  
For example, Nishikawa and Akimoto[1977] have estimated the “Tableaux” of the Choshu Clan in the western part of Japan in 
the 1840s, and made clear that the division of labor and the trade with other clans were highly developed.  In addition , it is well 
known that the development of commerce  was based on credit (Miyamoto[1961] p.61; Fujita, Miyamoto and Hasegawa[1978] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
explored in the prewar period. 
2 We pointed this out in the comment on the invited lecture by Avner Greif at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in 
1995.  The lecture has been published as Greif[1997].  
3 Many quantitative economic historians suppose that the inflation in the 1820s and 1830s started the sustainable economic growth 
by reducing  the real wage rate (Shimbo[1978]; Umemura[1981]; Miyamoto[1989]).   4
pp.112 –113). 
On the other hand, Iwahashi[1981] and Miyamoto[1988] examined the efficacy of the market mechanism, focusing on the 
price arbitrage between the local rice markets.  Miyamoto[1988] calculated correlation  coefficients of the growth rates of rice prices 
in five regions, namely Edo, Osaka, Nagoya, Hiroshima and Aizu, and found  that the coefficients increased from 0.57 in the 
second half of the seventeenth century to 0.72 in the first half of the nineteenth century (Table 1).  Miyamoto[1988] also calculated 
correlation coefficients using the data from twelve local rice markets 4.  In this case, while the upward trend is not observed, the 
coefficients are as large as about 0.7 in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.  These results imply that price 
arbitrage worked fairly well among the local rice markets. 
Furthermore, Ito[1993] and Wakita[1996] tested the efficiency of the rice market with a more sophi sticated methodology.  As 
is well  known, the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka was one of the earliest futures market s in the world (Duffie[1989]).  The Dojima 
Rice Exchange was equipped with a mechanism for settling accounts as well as a membership system.  Rice futures were traded 
during a certain period.  Ito[1993] tested econometrically whether the price on the first day of the trading period was an unbiased 
estimator of the last day’s price, as predicted by the efficient market hypothesis.  Ito[1993] obtained a result that  refuted the 
efficient market hypothesis.  On the other hand, Wakita[1996] retested the hypothesis, splitting the data by season, to yield the 
result  that the efficient market hypothesis could not be rejected for the spring and autumn markets. 
 
(2)  Legal system 
Assuming a developed market economy in the Edo Era and using North’s framework, we naturally would expect the public 
system for contract enforcement to have worked well in the Edo Era.  However, as discussed below, this was not the case. 
The legal system in the Edo Era has been investigated in the legal history literature.  The law system in the Edo Era was 
composed of Bakufu law, ryoshu (lord) law, and jito (local lord) law.  These three categories of law applied to the area directly 
administrated by the Bakufu, the area administrated by  han  (clan), and the area administrated by hatamoto (vassals of the Bakufu), 
respectively.  The lords were allowed to legislate their own laws, and therefore ryoshu laws differed from each other.  However, 
Bakufu law basically provided a standard for ryoshu law (Ishii[1960] p.368; Kasai[1994] pp.137–141).  The description below 
concerns Bakufu law. 
In the Edo Era, jurisdiction and administration were not separated, and the administration agencies  of  the  Bakufu, namely 
the Jisha Bugyo (the chief secretary in charge of temples and shrines), the Machi Bugyo (the chief secretary in charge of Edo and 
Osaka) and the Kanjo Bugyo (the chief secretary in charge of finance) carried out the functions of  jurisdiction.  The Jisha Bugyo 
controlled the jurisdiction concerning temples and shrines.  The Machi Bugyo controlled the jurisdiction concerning Edo and Osaka, 
and the Kanjo Bugyo controlled the jurisdiction of the area under the Bakufu’s direct administration.  As  the jurisdictional agency 
of the higher level, there was the Hyojosho, composed of the three chief secretaries and the Metsuke (the assistant to the Roju).  The 
Hyojosho took charge of important criminal affairs and civil affairs  across the  borders of the three  Bugyo (Takigawa[1985] 
pp.156 –159; Kasai[1994] pp.147–148). 
As at present, criminal affairs ( ginmi suji ) and civil affairs ( deiri suji) were  distinct, and were conducted  by different 
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procedures.  Concerning criminal affairs, whether there was accusation or not, the Bugyo arrested the criminal and placed him/her 
before a court.  On the other hand, for civil affairs, the process of justice was initiated by a suit of the plaintiff (Fujiwara and 
Maki[1995] p.233).  Hereafter, we focus mainly on civil affa irs. 
Civil affairs were classified into three categories, namely honkuji, kanekuji and nakamagoto.  Kanekuji were suits concerning 
credit with interest and credit without collateral.  Nakamagoto were suits concerning the distribution of profit within private 
organizations.  Honkuji were civil suits other than kanekuji and  nakamagoto.  It is remarkable that the above classification 
contributed to the solidity of the protection of the plaintiff.  The most rigidly protected by the jurisdictional authorities was the right 
concerning  honkuji, while the other extreme was nakamagoto.  Regarding  nakamagoto, in principle, the jurisdictional authorities did 
not accept suits, on the grounds that they  should be resolved within the organization.  Kanekuji lay in between, and protection of 
the plaintiff’s right was relatively weak, compared with honkuji (Maki and Fujiwara[1995] pp.241–242; Kasai[1994] pp.161–163). 
The weakness of the plaintiff’s right concerning  kanekuji was  symbolized by Aitai Sumashi Rei, a temporary act prescribing 
that the jurisdictional authorities would not accept any  kanekuji suits.  In Edo City,  Aitai Sumashi Rei was promulgated in 1661, 1663, 
1682, 1685, 1702, 1719, 1746, 1789, 1797 and 1843 (Ishii[1960] p.532), which means that this act was by no means extraordinary.  
Aitai Sumashi Rei did not deny the credit itself, but it is remarkable that the jurisdiction al authorities from time to time suspended 
enforcement of contracts in the Edo Era.  North’s framework cannot consistently explain this fact, nor the highly developed market 
economy based on credit.  As mentioned in Section 1, we suppose that the key  to resolving this puzzle is kabu nakama. 
 
3. Organization and function of kabu nakama 
A k abu nakama is defined as  “a group composed of members who have  kabu.”  Kabu means a business license granted by the public 
authorities.  Usually a  kabu was embodied in a wooden card, and was an object of inheritance, loan, pawn and trade.  If a member 
intended to sell his kabu, it was necessary to have the approv al of the other members.  Each kabu nakama had a members’ meeting 
(yoriai) as a decision-making organization, and a manager (gyoji) as its executive (Miyamoto[1938] chapter 3). 
Kabu nakama  emerged in the seventeenth century.  In the early seventeenth century, the Bakufu prohibited the private 
collusion of merchants and artisans.  However, its policy started to change in the middle of the century.  As a part of  the Kyoho 
Reform in the early eighteenth century,  the Bakufu adopted a policy of promoting kabu nakama for the purpose of controlling prices 
and distribution.  Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2, during  the Tanuma Period in  the 1770s and 1780s, the Bakufu promoted 
kabu nakama still more actively to collect taxes, as well as to expand commerce (Inoue et al .[1988] p.823; Shinbo[1978] p.308). 
Miyamoto[1938] classified the functions of  kabu nakama into four categories, namely, monopoly, protection of interest, 
coordination, and maintenance of reputation.  Included i n the categories of protection of interest and maintenance of reputation  is 
the function of contract enforcement  in which  we are interested here.  For example, “The Code of Salt Wholesale Merchants” (1741) 
prescribed that “If a broker cheats one of the members of the kabu nakama concerning the salt price, all of the members should 
promise to suspend trade with the broker who has cheated.” 
Interestingly enough, the mode of conduct prescribed in the Code was essentially the same as the Multiple Punishment 
Strategy (MPS), which Greif[1993] formulated regarding the coalition of Maghribis traders in medieval Mediterranean society.  If 
a kabu nakama took the MPS as prescribed in the Code, a cheating broker would lose future profit from trade not only with the 
cheated merchant himself but also with all of the other members of the kabu nakama .  Therefore, the broker would choose to be   6
honest rather  than to cheat  for a single gain. 
The cases in which kabu nakama adopted the MPS regarding commercial trade were not limited to the example of the salt 
merchants mentioned above.  Among the codes of  kabu nakama that Miyamoto[1938] collected, we can find eleven cases prescribing 
the MPS concerning commercial trade, of which eight apply to  wholesale merchant nakama, and four to a broker nakama (Table 2-A, 
B).  Each of them prescribes that all the nakama members should suspend commercial trade with the offender who has cheated one 
of the  nakama members.  As for the punished member, nine of the eleven codes concerned non -payment or arrearage of price.  
Besides non-payment and arrearage of price, non -payment of commission (Case 2 of Table 2-A), non -delivery of the commodity 
(Case 3 of Table 2 -A) and the provision of a poor quality commodity (Case  4 of Table  2-B) were regarded as cheating to be 
punished.  
Kabu nakama  played this role not only in ordinary commercial trade, but also in organizing production, namely in 
managing the putting-out system.  The putting-out system has supposed to play the major role in the weaving industry in Edo 
Era Japan5.  Landes[1969] focused on the putting-out system in the textile industry from a comparative institutional standpoint, 
and regarded the possibility of embezzling yarn as its inherent problem6.  In other words, the relationship between the weaver 
and the subcontracting weaver can be  regarded as a typical agency  relationship with asymmetric information, and the weaver 
was always faced with the possibility of being  embezzled by the subcontractor.  Therefore, unless a certain mechanism for 
overcoming this possibility exists, the putting-out system cannot work.  We suppose that in Edo Era Japan the  mechanism was 
provided by kabu nakama. 
As a case in which production was organized by the putting-out system, we focus on the silk weaving industry in Kiryu, 
which was in what is now the  Gunma Prefecture.  The silk weaving industry was started in Kiryu in the early eighteenth century.  
It is remarkable that kabu nakama began to be organized about the same time,  the Silk Broker Nakama in 1713, the Spreader Nakama 
in 1774 and the Weaver Nakama in 1797 (The Editorial Committee of the History of Kiryu Weavings[1935] pp.360–361). 
The Code of the Weaver Nakama in 1824 (Case 7 of Table 3) prescribed that “If a spinner or a subcontracting weaver returns 
products containing  less yarn  than the weaver supplied, the price of the yarn deficit should be subtracted from the payment to the 
spinner or the subcontracting weaver.  If cheating occurs, the nakama member should report it to the  nakama manager.  In this case, 
                                                                    
5 The role of the putting-out system in t he cotton-weaving industry in Edo Era Japan is reflected in the vicissitudes of the local 
production places.  Abe[1988] found a couple of important insights by compiling the information in the local histories and the 
histories of local industrial associations.  First, in many places, production of weavings as merchandise started after the latter half 
of the eighteenth century, and the Tanuma Period was the most important epoch in the development of the cotton weaving 
industry.  Second, the new production pl aces that emerged after the latter half of the eighteenth century developed faster than the 
older places , and in many of those new places the putting-out system was used.  These  findings suggest that the putting-out 
system brought about the development of the new production places after the latter half of the eighteenth century.  Moreover, the 
second finding is remarkable, because  the Tanuma Period was  the heyday of kabu nakama as mentioned above. 
6 Embezzling in the putting-out system was observed also in early twentieth-century Japan.  Abe[1989] reports that the 
subcontracting weavers cheated the entrusting weavers through the embezzling of yarn and default on obligations in the Osaka 
area (pp.203-204).   7
all of the nakama members should not entrust yarn or weaving machines to the cheater.”     
The case of the Kiryu Weaver Nakama is remarkable in the following  ways.  First, the problem that it was intended to resolve 
was the embezzlement of yarn, namely  that which Landes[1969] called the problem inherent in the putting-out system.  Second, 
the Kiryu Weaver Nakama adopted the strategy that all the members should suspend entrusting yarn and weaving machines to 
a subcontractor who cheated one of the  nakama members.  In other words, they used the MPS to res olve the inherent problem of 
the putting-out system. 
A similar example concerning the putting-out system can be observed also in Osaka.  The code of the Seven Nakama of Wool 
and Cotton (Case 5 of Table 3) prescribed that “The cloth dyeing should be entrusted to the members of a certain dyeing artisan 
nakama.  If an artisan cheats one of our members, the Seven Nakama should agree not to entrust dyeing to the artisan, and this 
measure should be written down by each of our members.” 
Furthermore, kabu nakama adopted the MPS to cope with the possibility of cheating inside the firm.  For example, the 
weavers in Kiryu directly employed workers, besides sub-contractors, under the putting-out system.  Concerning those 
employees, the above-mentioned Code of 1824 prescribed that “If male and female employees as well as temporary  workers cheat 
one of the members, and it cannot be ignored, the cheated member should report it to the nakama manager.  We should write the 
cheaters’ names on the black list, and never employ them.” (Case 6 of Table 3)  
Examples of the MPS concerning employment relationships can be found also in the codes of the merchant  nakama.  The 
Code of the Rice and Exchange Nakama in 1751 (Case1 of Table 3) prescribed that  “If a member discharges servants, sales clerks 
or shop boys because of their cheating, he should announce it to the other members.  The nakama members should not employ the 
cheaters, even if the ex-employer has no objection to their doing so.” 
Miyamoto[1938] interpreted this prescription  as being intended  to prevent drain of the code, of skills and knowledge, and 
of  the ex-employer’s relationships  with his/her customers.  This interpretation is reflected in the fact  that Miyamoto[1938] 
classified these cases in the category of coordination  rather than protection of interest.  It is true that concerning some kabu nakama 
his  interpretation is correct, because they prescribed that the other members could employ the dismissed employees if the 
ex-employer approved.  However, in cases where re-employment was prohibited whether the ex-employer approved or not, like 
the Rice and Exchange Nakama mentioned above, the reason cannot be  the wish to avoid  leakage of knowledge.  It is more 
appropriately interpreted as the MPS. 
The MPS is clearly observed in  the case of the Code of Domestic Raw Indigo Broker Nakama (Case 4 of Table 3).  It prescribed 
that all the nakama members should not hire the ex-employee who cheated, but that if the employee was dismissed peacefully, the 
members could employ him after inquiries to the ex-employer.  Those cases indicate that kabu nakama played the role of supporting 
the employment relationship through the MPS. 
In general, a couple of conditions are needed  for the MPS to work well, or, more technically, to be an equilibrium of a game.  
One is the information transmission mechanism for delivering the information  on  cheating to all the members of  the nakama.  
Many of the nakama codes include clauses concerning this issue.  The kabu nakama members shared the information on cheating by 
circulating a letter (Case 8 of Table 3), by registration (Case 6 of Table 2-A, Case 5 and 7 of Table 3), and by publication (Case 5 
of Table 2-A).  In many cases, the  nakama managers (gyoji) played the role of mediators of information transmission (Case 3 of Table 
2-B, Case 7 and 8 of Table 3).   8
Second, if the cheater expected to earn substantial profit from the trade with merchants other than the nakama members, the 
MPS is not an equilibrium .  Concerning this condition, the privilege of monopolizing a certain business in a specific area was 
significant for the kabu nakama in Edo Era Japan.  Because the cheater could find few partners for trade other than nakama members 
due to the privilege, they should have expected substantial loss of future profit  from the MPS.  It is worth stressing that the kabu 
nakama’s function  of govern ing transaction s, on which we focus in this paper, was not independent of its monopoly function. 
 
4. Empirical test of the function of kabu nakama: The Tenpo Reform as a natural experiment 
The Bakufu, which promoted the kabu nakama in the eighteenth century, changed its policy in the 1840s.  In the early nineteenth 
century, the Bakufu, whose major revenue source  was a tax paid in terms of rice, came to be in financial difficulties, mainly  because 
of the stagnation in the price of rice and the rise of other commodities’ prices.  The  Roju Tadakuni Nizuno started the Tenpo Reform 
in 1841 to resolve this problem.  As a part of the Reform, the Bakufu prohibited kabu nakama, because it regarded kabu nakama as 
a major cause of the inflation (Fujita[1989] pp.146–147).  However, the prohibition was subsequently withdrawn in 1851 as 
explained  below (Miyamoto[1938] pp.337–343) 7. 
We can test the function of kabu nakama by comparing the economy in the period from 1842 to 1851, when kabu nakama were 
prohibited , with the economy before that period 8.  From the hypothesis presented in the previous section that the kabu nakama 
played the role of governing transaction s, the implication that the prohibition of  kabu nakama would cause disorder and contraction 
of trade can be drawn.  By confronting this implication with the reality, we can test the above hypothesis. 
Miyamoto[1938] wrote that as a result of the kabu nakama prohibition, production decreased, the distribution system went 
into disorder, and a credit crunch occurred.  The evidence he relied on was a memorandum of Edo Machi Bugyo Kagemoto Toyama  
from 1848.  In the memorandum, Toyama wrote that while the  kabu was abolished, it is said that credit became difficult to obtain, 
prices did not fall, and the people became still more distressed (p.330).  
Moreover, Osaka Machi Bugyo Masayuki Abe wrote “Since kabu nakama were prohibited and the people have become able 
to trade every commodity freely, trade has become disorganized, prices have been unstable, and monitoring has become difficult.  
Consequently, commodities have become unevenly distributed, local provinces are faced with inconvenience as to everyday 
goods, and it is possible to influence on the distribution to Edo” (Kawaura[1959] p.130–131).  The withdrawal of the prohibition of 
kabu nakama in 1851 was the result of the Bakufu’s accepting these opinions of the bureaucrats. 
In 1856, after the withdrawal of the prohibition, the Bakufu made Shoshiki Gakari Myoshu (the monitors of the commodity 
prices) 9 investigate the influence of the prohibition, and found  that  the distribution system was substantially malfunctioning 
                                                                    
7 However, this measure did not completely restore the regime before 1841 in the following respects.  First, the Bakufu did not 
issue the wooden card that certified the business privilege (kabu fuda), and did not collect tax (myogakin) from kabu nakama.  Second, 
the Bakufu instructed kabu nakama to approve new memberships on request, and not to restrict their membership without an 
obvious reason (Miyamoto[1938] pp.324-338). 
8 It is more appropriate to compare with the period before the prohibition than with the period after the withdrawal of the 
prohibition, because, as mentioned in the previous footnote, the withdrawal did not completely restore the earlier conditions. 
9 The Monitors of the Commodity Prices were appointed from  the city managers (myoshu) by  the Bakufu in 1843 (Koda[1928] p.373).   9
during the prohibition period (Honjo[1931]).  In addition , Honjo[1931] cited the following petition of the authority in charge of 
weavers and weaving in Nishijin, the center of traditional silk weaving in Kyoto (pp.47–48): 
 
Nishijin weavings have been the most  famous specialty of this region.  However, in recent years, not only weavers but 
also people engaged in the distribution of yarn have been beset by difficulties.  Consequently, the traditional discipline 
has waned, and some weavers sell scamped products, which has an influence on the weavers who keep the traditional 
discipline.  The undisciplined weavers might scamp important weavings including those for Bakufu use.  In particular, 
weavers who entered the industry after the prohibition of kabu nakama and do not have serious intentions  learn dishonest 
manipulation, which will damage the reputation of the specialty of Nishijin. 
 
This document indicates that the prohibition of kabu nakama damaged the governance of transaction s in the Nishijin area, and, 
together with the above descriptive materials, supports our hypothesis. 
We now try to test our hypothesis with  quantitative data.  Figure 2 denotes the sales of the Edo branch of  Echigoya, a kimono 
shop managed by Mitsui.  Sales declined sharply in 1842, just after the prohibition of kabu nakama, and stagnated at a low level 
after that.  It is apparent that a structural change took place between 1841 and 1842.  However, sales  by a certain enterprise might 
reflect  influences specific to it, and especially in this case there might be a bias that Echigoya had enjoyed the privilege of being 
a member of a kabu nakama.  In order to avoid these problems, it is desirable to test the hypothesis using sectoral or macro data.  
For this purpose, we first use the real money supply data, referred to in Figure 1.  Figure 3 magnifies the data, focusing on 
the period from the 1830s to the 1850s.  The bar diagram in the figure denotes the famine index  of Akashi[1989].  Akashi[1989] 
constructed this index, which classifies the agricultural harvest of each year into five categories, from “famine” (4) to “good 
har vest” (0), based on Mukoyama[1917] and Society Section of Education Department, Tokyo Prefecture[1975].  The index was 4 
in 1836 and 1837, which are well known for the serious Tenpo Famine.  In a society like Edo Japan that depends heavily upon 
agriculture, supply shocks due to natural conditions might cause substantial effects on the whole economy.  We refer to the famine 
index in order to control those supply shocks. 
The growth rates of the real money supply were negative in seven of the nine years in the period when  kabu nakama was 
prohibited (1842–1850), and the average growth rate was -2.29% per year.  On the other hand, in the nine-year period just before 
the prohibition (1833–1841), it grew at the rate of 0.571% per year on average.  As expected, after the prohibition of kabu nakama, 
the growth rate of the money supply decreased.  Furthermore, while the period before the prohibition includes the two famine 
years whose famine index was 4, the period of prohibition includes no famine years. 
We check this result formally by regressing the growth rate of real money supply on a dummy variable, which is 1 if  kabu 
nakama was prohibited in the year, and 0 otherwise (PROHIB),  a dummy variable which is 1 if the famine index was 4 in the year, 
and 0 otherwise (FAMINE), a time trend (TIME), and a constant.  The expected sign of the two dummy variables is negative.  
Table 4 shows the result of an ordinary least squares regression.  The coefficient of  FAMINE is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  It should be stressed that the coefficient of  PROHIB is negative and its p-value is 0.0676.  If we omit 
TIME, which is not statistically significant in equation (1), the coefficient of  PROHIB is statistically significant at  the 5% level 
(equation (1)).  In addition, the absolute value of the coefficient of PROHIB in equation (1) is 0.1414, which means that the growth   10
rate of  the real money supply was 14.14% lower in the period when kabu nakama was prohibited than in the other period. 
Next, we test the decline of economic performance in the period of kabu nakama prohibition from another standpoint.  As 
stated in Section 2, correlations of the prices in different regional markets have been used to measure the development of the 
market economy of the Edo Era.  If the prohibition of kabu nakama damaged the market mechanism, the correlations of prices would 
be expected to have decreased.  It is notable that  Shinbo[1982] pointed out that the trend of the relative price in Osaka, compared 
with the price in Edo, chang ed substantially around 1840 (p.11), although he did not focus on the role of kabu nakama. 
While Shinbo[1982] used the price index of a five years’ moving  average, it is appropriate to use the original series for the 
purpose of this paper.  So we compile a new price index by the same method using the original sources on which Shinbo[1982] 
relied, namely Kin’yu Kenkyukai ed.[1937], Mitsui Bunko ed.[1952], and Miyamoto ed.[1963].  The commodities included are 
unpolished rice, polished rice, barley, soybeans , raw cotton, wax, muscovado, bean paste, soy sauce, and sake.  The weight is 0.30 
for unpolished rice and 0.07 for the other items.  Figure 4 denotes the price indices in Edo and Osaka10.  It can be observed that 
while they were very closely correlated until the early 1840s, the correlation subsequently declined.  The correlation coefficient 
was 0.961 in the period from 1833 to 1841, while it was 0.788 in the period from 1842 to 1850. 
Focusing on rice, we can  perform  a similar test for many areas around Japan besides Edo and Osaka.  Iwahashi[1981] 
compiled time series of rice prices for Osaka, Omi, Banshu, Fukuchiyama, Hiroshima, Bocho, Saga, Kumamoto, Edo, Nagoya, 
Shinshu, Aizu and Dewa.  The series from Osaka to Kumamoto are in terms of silver, while the others are in terms of gold.  We 
converted the series in terms of silver into ones in terms of gold, using the gold price in Osaka available in Shinbo[1978] (p.173). 
Table 6 is the correlation matrix of those series for the periods 1833–1841 and 1842–1850.  The averages of the correlation 
coefficients of those two periods were 0.824 and 0.487 respectively.  Comparing each coefficient with its counterpart in the other 
period, we find that in 70 out of 78 cases, the coefficient decreased in 1842–1850.  It is certain that the price arbitrage function of 
the market declined in the period of kabu nakama prohibition 11. 
In this section we have examined the performance of the Japanese economy in the period of kabu nakama prohibition, using 
quantitative data as well as descriptive methods .  All of the methods and analyses indicate that the performance of the economy 
and market mechanism declined in the period of  kabu nakama  prohibition, compared with the period before it.  Those results 
support our hypothesis that  kabu nakama played the role of transaction governance 12. 
                                                                    
10 For reasons of data availability, Shinbo[1982] substituted the prices concerning bean paste, soy sauce, sake and polished rice in 
Kyoto for those in Osaka, and converted them into prices in terms of gold using the gold price in Kyoto , which is available in 
Miyamoto[1981].  We followed Shinbo[1982].  
11 Miyamoto[1988] calculated the variation coefficients using the cross-section data of rice prices in the same thirteen regions to find 
that the coefficients increased after the 1830’s.  He interpreted this as suggesting a structural change in the nation-wide network 
of the rice markets.  Although he did not mention kabu nakama, this finding is consistent with our hypothesis. 
12 To compare the economic performances of the periods before and after kabu nakama was established is another important strategy 
for testing our hypothesis.  The facts that the sustainable growth of real money supply started around the Tanuma Period (Section 
2), and that the putting-out system and the merchandise production began in many cotton -weaving places at about the same time 
(Section 3) are consistent with our hypothesis.  Also, Shinbo and Hasegawa[1988] pointed out that kabu nakama of merchants trading   11
 
Concluding remarks 
Sustainable growth in the market economy started somewhat prior to 1790, before the Meiji Restoration in Japan.  At the same time, 
Aitai Sumashi Rei , promulgated repeatedly, implies that third party enforcement of contracts did not work well.  In this sense, 
premodern Japanese economic development provides a significant counter-example to North’s view that a public system of third 
party contract enforcement is a prerequisite for sustainable economic development. 
Kabu nakama  played the role of contract enforcement, substituting for a public authority.  Many of the codes of kabu nakama 
included articles prescribing that all of the nakama members should suspend trade with a person who has cheated one of  their own.  
It implies  that kabu nakama in Edo Era Japan adopted the Multiple Punishment Strategy (MPS), which Greif[1993] formulated 
concerning the coalition of Maghribis merchants in medieval Mediterranean society.  As Greif made clear, the MPS reduces the 
incentive for the trade  partner to cheat, and through it enables expansion of trade under the condition that third party enforcement 
by the public  authority is insufficient.  Kabu nakama   in  Edo Era Japan adopted the MPS not only for ordinary commercial 
transaction s, but also  for  the putting-out system and employment.  In other words, the MPS of  kabu nakama  contributed to 
organizing production as well as to expanding commerce. 
Kabu nakama provided conditions making the MPS effective, or more precisely, an equilibrium  of a game.  First, kabu nakama 
provided  an internal information transmission mechanism.  Information about the cheater was shared among the nakama 
members by means of registration in a document, circulation of a letter, or public announcement, with the manager of the nakama 
as a mediator.  The second condition was  the monopoly on business in a certain area.  This monopoly reduced the expected value 
of the future profit of the cheater who was punished, which in turn made the MPS effective. 
We tested the theoretical hypothesis that kabu nakama functioned as the institutional basis of a market economy, using the 
opportunity of a natural experiment that  was provided by the prohibition of kabu nakama in the Tenpo Reform.  First, some 
documents indicate that the distribution system was  disordered and the quality of production was in decay during the kabu nakama 
prohibition.  Second, the growth rate of the real money supply declined in this period of kabu nakama prohibition, and the decline 
was statistically significant.  Third, the price arbitrage function of the market declined in the same period.  These results support 
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￿￿Figure 2￿The Sales of Edo Store of Echigoya Kan
￿
Source:The accounting books of Echigoya (Mokuroku Ginmi Yori) of various years, possesed by the Mitsui Archives.
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Figure 4￿Growth Rates of the Prices in Edo and Osaka ￿
Source: See text.Table 1  Correlation coefficient of the growth rates of the rice prices across regions






Note: See text.Table 2 List of the Kabu Nakama Codes including the MPS concerning the Commercial Trade
A. Kabu nakama of the wholesale merchants 
Number Year  Name of the codes Source
1 1741 The Code of the Salt Wholesale Merchants Miyamoto[1938], pp.189-190
2 1741 The Code of the Irand Salt Wholesale Merchants Ibid, p.190
3 1773 The Code of the Yodobashi Rice Wholesale Merchants Nakama Ibid, p.189
4 1781 The Code of the Chacoal Wholesale Merchants Nakama Ibid, p.189
5 1781 The Code of the Firewood Wholesale Merchants  Ibid, p.192
6 1785 The Code of the Firewood Wholesale Merchants  Ibid, p.190
7 1787 The Code of the Three Town Salted Fish, Dried Fish and Dried 
Bonito Wholesale Merchants Kabu Nakama
Ibid, p.190
8 1818 The Code of the Raw Fish Wholesale Merchants Ibid, p.193
B. Kabu nakama of the brokers
Number Year  Name of the codes Source
1 1781 The Code of the Suger Brokers Miyamoto[1938], p.191
2 1809 The Code of  the Indigo Brokers Ibid, p.192
3 1816 The Code of the Seven Nakama of Wool and Cotton Brokers Ibid, p.191Table 3 List of the Kabu Nakama Codes including the MPS concerning the Organization of Production
Number Year  Name of the codes Source
1 1751 The Code of the Rice and Exchange Merchant Nakama Miyamoto[1938], p.227
2 1753 The Code of the Dried Food Merchants Ibid, p.227
3 1789 The Code of the Sanjo Cotton Wholesale Merchant Nakama Ibid, p.227
4 1809 The Code of the Domestic Indigo Brokers Ibid, p.227
5 1816 The Code of the Seven Nakama of Wool and Cotton Brokers Ibid, p.200, 227
6 1824 The Code of Kiryu Weaver Nakama The Editorial Board of the History of 
the Kiryu Wavings[1934], pp.368-369
7 1832 The Code of the Bowl, Basket and Turnery Artisan Nakama   Miyamoto[1938], p.228-229












        t-values in parentheses.Table 5-A Correlation Matrix of the Growth Rates of the Regional Rice Prices 1833-1841
Osaka Omi Banshu Fukuchiyama Hiroshima Bocho Saga Kumamoto Edo Nagoya Shinshu Aizu Dewa Average
Osaka 1.000 0.892
Omi 0.969 1.000 0.853
Banshu 0.937 0.909 1.000 0.877
Fukuchiyama 0.974 0.962 0.979 1.000 0.893
Hiroshima 0.976 0.964 0.956 0.973 1.000 0.894
Bocho 0.969 0.910 0.941 0.966 0.951 1.000 0.888
Saga 0.937 0.895 0.977 0.975 0.944 0.952 1.000 0.873
Kumamoto 0.821 0.776 0.911 0.889 0.876 0.875 0.903 1.000 0.815
Edo 0.892 0.940 0.864 0.916 0.886 0.819 0.830 0.777 1.000 0.797
Nagoya 0.992 0.972 0.912 0.961 0.955 0.941 0.909 0.790 0.924 1.000 0.874
Shinshu 0.341 0.123 0.356 0.280 0.336 0.418 0.379 0.481 0.108 0.302 1.000 0.325
Aozu 0.947 0.889 0.900 0.915 0.962 0.951 0.885 0.860 0.811 0.918 0.511 1.000 0.874
Dewa 0.943 0.928 0.879 0.929 0.952 0.960 0.888 0.824 0.800 0.909 0.268 0.941 1.000 0.852
Average 0.824
Note: See text.
Table 5-B Correlation Matrix of the Growth Rates of the Regional Rice Prices 1842-1850
Osaka Omi Banshu Fukuchiyama Hiroshima Bocho Saga Kumamoto Edo Nagoya Shinshu Aizu Dewa Average
Osaka 1.000 0.642
Omi 0.867 1.000 0.572
Banshu 0.893 0.888 1.000 0.676
Fukuchiyama 0.829 0.807 0.939 1.000 0.659
Hiroshima 0.458 0.259 0.450 0.663 1.000 0.400
Bocho 0.851 0.819 0.924 0.971 0.631 1.000 0.667
Saga 0.603 0.633 0.789 0.912 0.736 0.921 1.000 0.569
Kumamoto 0.702 0.695 0.779 0.832 0.765 0.847 0.874 1.000 0.582
Edo 0.086 -0.212 0.037 -0.014 0.144 -0.044 -0.069 -0.092 1.000 0.001
Nagoya 0.481 0.284 0.274 0.216 0.281 0.316 0.189 0.310 0.646 1.000 0.237
Shinshu 0.624 0.691 0.634 0.430 -0.095 0.532 0.316 0.442 -0.379 0.041 1.000 0.373
Aozu 0.649 0.616 0.763 0.605 0.149 0.567 0.400 0.449 -0.088 -0.100 0.750 1.000 0.468
Dewa 0.656 0.518 0.735 0.719 0.359 0.673 0.524 0.385 -0.003 -0.090 0.494 0.852 1.000 0.485
Average 0.487
Note: See text.